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In this note we provide a simple proof of the incompactness over
Routley-Meyer B-frames of the @1 fragment of the second order propo-
sitional relevant language. Moreover, we observe that this fragment is
clearly still recursively enumerable.
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Introduction
We will call basic second order propositional relevant logic to the result of
adding propositional quantifiers @p and Dp to the standard language of rele-
vant logic when interpreted over Routley-Meyer structures for the system B
(cf. [7]).1
The idea of the present note is to show how the incompactness argument
for the system KW from [3] (pp. 178-179)2 can be adapted to establish the
incompactness of the @1 fragment (where all quantifiers are universal and
1In the literature, Routley-Meyer structures for the system R have received the most at-
tention in this context (see, for example, [4]).
2Which gives virtually immediately the incompactness of second order propositional
modal logic.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:1) 2019, Article no. 1
2come at the front)3 of the second order propositional relevant language over
Routley-Meyer B-models.
Recall that a logic can be said to be compact if for any collection of sen-
tences Γ, Γ does not have a model only if some finite Γ1 Ď Γ does not have
a model either. This terminology comes from Rasiowa in [6], with the obvi-
ous topological reference. Hence, by incompactness we mean the failure of
compactness.
So, in this article, we establish that there is a set of @1 second order propo-
sitional relevant formulas that is finitely satifiable on the class of Routley-
Meyer B-models even though it is not satisfiable on this class. Incidentally,
this also provides an example in relevant logic of a system (with a language
more expressive than the standard relevant language) which is recursively ax-
iomatizable but incompact. Observe that the obvious expressive extensions of
standard propositional relevant languages which could be hoped to be incom-
pact, namely, infinitary extensions, cannot be recursively axiomatized since,
for starters, their syntax is not arithmetizable.
We start by reviewing the Routley-Meyer semantics in §1 and establish the
recursive axiomatizability of the @1 fragment of basic second order proposi-
tional relevant logic. In §2, we prove the main theorem of the paper and a
lemma also implying that the @1 fragment of the second order propositional
relevant language is more expressive than the standard propositional relevant
language. Finally, in §3 we summarize the work.
1 Preliminaries
The second order propositional relevant language L2 will contain a countable
list PROP of propositional variables p, q, r . . . and the logical symbols: ∼
(negation), ^ (conjunction), _ (disjunction), ˝ (fusion), Ñ (implication), t
(the Ackermann constant), @p, Dp (propositional quantifiers). Formulas are
constructed in the usual way:
φ ::“ p | t | ∼φ | φ^ ψ | φ_ ψ | φÑ ψ || φ ˝ ψ | @p.φ | Dp.φ,
for p P PROP. The @1 fragment of L2 will contain all formulas equivalent to
formulas of the form @p0, . . . pn.φ, where φ is quantifierless.
3In classical second order logic, restriction to second order universal quantifications also
suffices for incompactness: the property of well-foundedness is Π11.
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3In this paper, a Routley-Meyer frame for
L2
is a structure F “ xW,R, ˚, Oy, where W is a non-empty set, H ‰ O Ď W ,
˚ is an operation ˚ : W ÝÑ W , and R Ď W ˆW ˆW satisfies p1-p5 below.
In the standard way, we will abbreviate DzpOz ^Rzxyq by x ď y.
p1. x ď x
p2. If x ď y and Ryzv then Rxzv.
p3. If x ď y and Rzyv then Rzxv.
p4. If x ď y and Rzvx then Rzvy.
p5. If x ď y then y˚ ď x˚ .
p6. If x ď y and x P O then y P O.
The relation ď is a preorder. We can see this as follows. By p1, we have
reflexivity. Now if x ď y (i.e., DzpOz ^ Rzxyq) and y ď z (i.e., DvpOv ^
Rzyzq), by p3, we have that DvpOv ^Rzxzq, i.e., x ď z.
A Routley-Meyer model for L2 is a pair xF, V y, where V : PROP ÝÑ
℘pW q is a function such that for any p P PROP, V ppq is upward closed under
the ď relation, that is, x P V ppq and x ď y implies that y P V ppq. We define
satisfaction at w in M recursively as follows:
M,w , t iff w P O,
M,w , p iff w P V ppq,
M,w , ∼φ iff M,w˚ . φ,
M,w , φ^ ψ iff M,w , φ and M,w , ψ,
M,w , φ_ ψ iff M,w , φ or M,w , ψ,
M,w , φÑ ψ iff for every a, b such that RMwab, if M,a , φ then M, b , ψ,
M,w , φ ˝ ψ iff there are a, b such that RMabw, M,a , φ and M, b , ψ.
M,w , @p.φ iff for all upwards closed subsets S of W , M rp ÞÑ Ss, w , φ,
where M rp ÞÑ Ss is the model identical to M except that
is the model identical to M except that V ppq “ S.
M,w , Dp.φ iff there is an upwards closed subset S of W
such that M rp ÞÑ Ss, w , φ.
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4A formula φ is said to be true in a model M if M,w , φ for all w P O. φ is
said to be valid in a frame F (in symbols F , φ) if φ is true in any model M
based on F.
Lemma 1. (Hereditary Lemma) For any second order relevant formula φ,
model M based on a Routley-Meyer frame, and worlds x, y of M , x ď y
implies that M,x , φ only if M, y , φ.
Proof. By induction on formula complexity.
Consider a monadic second order language that comes with one function
symbol ˚, a constant T , a distinguished three place relation symbol R, and
a unary predicate variable P for each p P PROP. Following the tradition in
modal logic, we might call this a correspondence language Lcorr2 for L. Now
we can read a model M as a model for Lcorr2 in a straightforward way: W is
taken as the domain of the structure, V specifies the denotation of each of the
predicates P,Q, . . . , the collection O is the object assigned to the predicate
O, while ˚ is the denotation of the function symbol ˚ of L corr2 and R the
denotation of the relation R ofL corr2 .
Where t is a term in the correspondence language, we write φt{x for the
result of replacing x with t everywhere in the formula φ. Let us abreviate
the formula of Lcorr2 which expresses that the value of a given predicate P
is upwards closed under ď by UpďpP q. As expected, it is easy to specify a
translation from the formulas of the relevant language into formulas of first
order logic with one free variable as follows:
Txptq = Ox
Txppq = Px
Txp∼φq =  Txpφqx˚{x
Txpφ^ ψq = Txpφq ^ Txpψq
Txpφ_ ψq = Txpφq _ Txpψq
TxpφÑ ψq = @y, zpRxyz ^ Txpφqy{x Ą Txpψqz{xq
Txpφ ˝ ψq = Dy, zpRyzx^ Txpφqy{x ^ Txpψqz{xq.
Txp@p.φq = @P pUpďpP q Ą Txpφqq
TxpDp.φq = DP pUpďpP q ^ Txpφqq
The symbols  and Ą represent, respectively, boolean negation in classi-
cal logic and material implication either in classical or relevant logic (which
should not be confused with ∼ andÑ).
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5Next we prove a proposition to the effect that our proposed translation is
adequate. While , stands for satisfaction as defined for relevant languages,
( will be the usual Tarskian satisfaction relation from classical logic.
Proposition 2. For any w, M,w , φ if and only if M ( Txpφqrws.
The next result is easily established using Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. For any relevant formula φpp1, . . . , pnq, Routley-Meyer frame
F and world w of F, the following holds:
F , φ iff F ( @P1, . . . , PnpUpďpP1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ UpďpPnq Ą @wpOw Ą
Txpφqw{xqq.
The @1 fragment of the second order propositional relevant language is
more expressive over B-models than the relevant language without proposi-
tional quantifiers. For the latter is less expressive than first order logic while
the former can express some non-first order concepts (cf. Lemma 5 and [1]).
Proposition 4. The set of @1-validities of basic second order propositional
relevant logic is recursively axiomatizable.
Proof. First observe that a formula φ of the form @pk`1, . . . , pmψpp0, . . . , pkq
is an @1-validity iff @P0, . . . , Pk, Pk`1, . . . , PmpŹiďm UpďpPiq Ą @wpOw Ą
TxpψqT {xqq is a logical consequence (in the sense of classical logic) of σ,
where σ is the conjunction of p1-p4. The symbols P0, . . . , Pm do not occur
in σ, so φ is an @1-validity iff Źiďm UpďpPiq Ą @wpOw Ą TxpψqT {xq is a
logical consequence of σ. By the recursive enumerability of the set of validi-
ties of first order logic, the collection of all @1-validities of basic second order
propositional relevant logic is also recursively enumerable.
Now we use Craig’s trick (see Theorem 1 in [5]). Let fp0q, fp1q, fp2q, . . .
be one such enumeration of the @1-validities. For any second order proposi-
tional relevant formula φ, define recursively φ0 “df φ and φn`1 “df φn ^ φ.
Then ∆ “ tfpkqk : k ă ωu is a recursive set of second order propositional
relevant formulas. Moreover, since φ $B φk and φk $B φ for any k where
$B is the deducibility relation of the system B, we see that the collection ∆
of formulas is a recursive axiomatization of the set of all @1-validities.
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In this section we establish the main result of the paper (Theorem 6) by par-
alleling an argument from [3] in the context of relevant logic.
Put R#xy “df DzpRxyz _ Rxzyq and p “df pp _ ∼p Ñ pq ^ p∼p Ñ
p ^ ∼pq. Observe that for any frame F, and world x P W , there is T P
O such that R#Tx holds. In any frame F where @xpx˚ ď x ^ x ď x˚q,
using the Hereditary Lemma, we see that a formula of the form ∼φ _ ψ
behaves essentially as a material implication in a classical language at the
level of models based on F. Also, for any valuation V in any such frame F,
xF, V y, w , p iff for all x, y such thatRwxy, xF, V y, x , p and xF, V y, y ,
p iff for all x such that R#wx, xF, V y, x , p.
Now, for any frame F and valuation V on it, xF, V y , @p, qppp ^ ∼p Ñ
qq ^ pq Ñ p _ ∼pqq iff F ( @xpx˚ ď x ^ x ď x˚q. Let  “df ∼∼,
then on a frame F where @xpx˚ ď x ^ x ď x˚q holds, for any valuation V ,
xF, V y, w , p iff there some x such that R#wx and xF, V y, x , p.
Lemma 5. xF, V y , @p, qppp^∼pÑ qq^ pq Ñ p_∼pq^ pppp Ą pq^
pq Ą pqq iff (i) F ( @xpx˚ ď x ^ x ď x˚q and (ii) there is T P O s.t. there
is no infinite sequence of worlds s0, s1, s2 . . . such that T “ s0 ę sip0ăiăωq
and R#s0s1, R#s1s2, R#s2s3, . . .
Proof. Let F be an arbitrary Routley-Meyer frame. We have that if (i) holds,
@pppp Ą pq ^ p Ą pq implies (ii). For suppose (ii) fails, then for every
T P O there is an infinite sequence of worlds T “ s0 ę s1, s2 . . . such that
R#s0s1, R
#s1s2, R
#s2s3, . . . Now take any valuation V based on F such that
V ppq “ tw : w ę si, 0ăiăωu. By transitivity of ď, V ppq is upwards closed
under ď. For each si, si ď si, so xF, V y, si . p. Hence, xF, V y, T . p.
Also, by assumption, T ę si (0ăiăω), which mean that xF, V y, T , p. Now
let R#Tv and suppose that xF, V y, v , p but xF, V y, v . p. The latter
means that v ď si for some 0ăiăω, however since xF, V y, si`1 . p and
R#sisi`1, it must be that xF, V y, si . p, and by the Hereditary Lemma,
xF, V y, v . p. Hence, xF, V y, T , pp Ą pq. This concludes the left to
right direction of the proposition.
For the converse suppose xF, V y, T . pp Ą pq ^ p Ą p. If (i) holds,
one can build the desired sequence to falsify (ii) by taking x such that R#Tx
while xF, V y, x . p and applying xF, V y, T , pp Ą pq in conjunction
with the observation that F ( @xpR#Txq.
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7Theorem 6. The @1 fragment of basic second order propositional relevant
logic is incompact.
Proof. This time consider the set
Θ “ t@p, qppp^∼pÑ qq ^ pq Ñ p_∼pq ^ pppp Ą pq ^ pq Ą
pqqu Y t∼pi : i ă ωu Y tp0u Y tppi Ą pi`1q : i ă ωu.
First we note that this set is unsatisfiable. For if there were a model M such
that Θ holds at every T P O, M would contain a sequence of the sort forbid-
den by @ppppp Ą pq ^ pq Ą pq according to Lemma 5. To see this note
that since M,T , p0 there is y such that R#Ty and M, y , p0. Obviously,
T ę y by the Hereditary Lemma and the fact that M,T , ∼p0. Put s1 “ y.
Having obtained the n ` 1 element of the chain, sn`1 (and guaranteeing that
M, sn , pn by construction), we get sn`2 as follows. Recall that for every
world x, for some T 1 P O, R#T 1x. Since M, sn , pn and for every T P O,
M,T , ppn Ą pn`1q, then M, sn`1 , pn`2, that is, there is z such that
R#sn`1z and M, z , pn`2. We simply let sn`2 be z. Again, T ę z by the
Hereditary Lemma and the fact that M,T , ∼pn`2.
Now we show that Θ is finitely satisfiable. Suppose Θ0 Ă Θ is finite. For
each ną0, let Fn be the frame where Wn “ tk : k ď nu, Rn “ tx0, i, iy : i ď
nu Y txj, j ` 1, j ` 1y : jănu, O has only one memeber, T , which is simply
the number 0, and ˚n is the identity. Now let m be the biggest natural number
such that ppm Ą pm`1q P Θ0. Then consider a valuation V on the domain
of the frame Fm`2 such that V ppiq is an arbitrary upwards closed subset of
Wm`2 for i ą m`1, while V ppiq “ ti`1u (which is always upwards closed
in Fm`2) for i ă m` 2. It is not difficult to see, using Lemma 5, that then Θ0
is satisfied at T in xFm`2, V y.
3 Conclusion
We showed that, on the class of Routley-Meyer B-frames, there is a set of
@1 second order propositional relevant formulas which is finitely satisfiable
but not satisfiable. This fragment of L2 is rather powerful, indeed, for it can
express some non-first order concepts. However, it is still recursively axiom-
atizable. As a referee points out, the problem of whether this incompactness
carries over to the alternative semantics from [2] is still open.
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